

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

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USNMR SHAPE (VIA POUCH)

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN (VIA POUCH)

USAFE RAMSTEIN (VIA POUCH)

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5248

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS 7-31-79

TAGS: MILI, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING (AEW) PROGRAM

SECDEF FOR ODDR&E AND ISA; CSAF FOR AFRDQ AND AFRDP; CNO FOR OP-098  
AND OP-982E, JCS FOR J-5, USAF FOR XPX AND DOQ

REF: A. STATE 197909

B. USNATO 4777

BEGIN SUMMARY: REF A. REQUESTED USNATO ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE  
ACCEPTABILITY TO NATO OF SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES TO TWO US PROPOSALS  
FOR COOPERATIVE NATO AEW PROGRAMS WITH THE E-2C AND E-3A(AWACS).  
REF B. FORWARDED A PRELIMINARY USNATO ASSESSMENT. THIS MESSAGE  
PRESENTS A REVISED ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE AEW PRESENTATIONS AND  
SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS AT THE 10-12 OCT NAFAG SUB-GROUP 12 MEETING  
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IN PARIS; BRIEFLY REVIEWS THESE PRESENTATIONS; AND OFFERS COMMENTS  
AND SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PROBLEMS AND FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES.  
END SUMMARY.

1. PARIS PRESENTATIONS AND PROPOSALS:

A. FRANCE. THE FRENCH PRESENTATION (WHICH WAS NOT IN THE FORM OF A PROPOSAL) DISCUSSED THE RESULTS OF NATIONAL STUDIES AND EXPERIMENTATION WITH LOW AND MED-HIGH PRF RADARS.

A FRENCH ANALYSIS OF THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL RELATION TO THE ALPS LED TO ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL AEW REQUIREMENTS FOR A RADAR RANGE OF 150 KM AND A RADAR TRACK CAPACITY OF 50 TARGETS. IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL IF THE FRENCH "PAPER" SYSTEM COULD QUALIFY AS A SERIOUS CANDIDATE FOR THE NATO AEW PROGRAM WITHOUT MAJOR REORIENTATION OF SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE.

B. UNITED KINGDOM. THE UK PRESENTATION BRIEFLY DISCUSSED 4 ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS UNDER STUDY. THE FIRST TWO USED THE E-2C APS-120 RADAR IN THE BRITISH NIMROD OR 748 AIRFRAMES. IN THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, THE UK WOULD DEVELOPE THE RADAR "TAIL" (SIGNAL PROCESSING) TAILORED TO THEIR NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THE THIRD WAS A BRITISH FM INTERRUPTED CW RADAR WHICH THEY QUICKLY DISMISSED AS NOT BEING ABLE TO SATISFY NATO OVERLAND REQUIREMENTS. THE FOURTH, WHICH THE UK OFFERED AS A PROPOSAL FOR A COOPERATIVE NATO AEW PROGRAM, WAS FOR A UK COHERENT PLUSE DOPPLER RADAR TO BE OPTIMIZED FOR NATO OVERLAND USE. THE UK SYSTEMS ARE ALSO, BY AND LARGE, "PAPER" SYSTEMS, HOWEVER THEY APPEAR TO HAVE A MUCH STRONGER AEW TECHNOLOGICAL BASE FROM WHICH TO PROCEED. THE UK PROPOSAL CONTAINED LITTLE PROGRAM DATA AND NO COST DATA. THE UK DID NOT STATE WHY THEY DID NOT PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE 1 OR 2 (WITH THE E-2C RADAR), BUT WE SUSPECT IT IS BECAUSE THESE ARE ATTRACTIVE FALL-BACK POSITIONS. THE BRITISH STEADFASTLY MAINTAIN THAT THEY MUST MAKE A DECISION ON A NATIONAL PROGRAM (WHICH COULD BE ANY OF THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES) EARLY IN CY74 IN ORDER TO REPLACE THEIR AGING AEW FLEET BY 1980-81. THEY AEEAR TO BE SINCERE WHEN THEY STATE THEY HOPE THE SUB-GROUP WOURK WILL PROGRESS RAPIDLY AND PERMIT A NATO AEW DECISION BEFORE THEY ARE FORCED TO MAKE A NATIONAL DECISION. THEY ALSO INSIST AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY THAT THEIR NATIONAL REQUIREMENT IS FOR A MARITIME SYSTEM AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT CONSIDER ANYTHING WITH "EXCESS" CAPABILITY IF IT COSTS MORE.

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C. UNITED STATES. THE US MADE PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATIVE NATO AEW PROGRAMS FOR BOTH THE E-2C AND E-3A SYSTEMS WITH 5 BASIC OPTIONS. MOST ALLIANCE REPRESENTATIVES APPEARED IMPRESSED WITH THE ADVANCED HARDWARE AND TEST STATUS OF THE TWO US SYSTEMS AND THE AMOUNT OF PROGRAM AND COST DETAIL PRESENTED. THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE REMARKED PRIVATELY THAT HE HAD NEVER HEARD A MORE "COOPERATIVE" COOPERATIVE PROPOSAL. MOST REPRESENTATIVES SEEMED SURPRISED THAT THE UNIT AWACS COSTS WERE AS LOW AS THEY WERE, AND PARTICULARLY THAT THE TOTAL NATO PROGRAM COSTS FOR THE CORE AWACS CAME OUT LOWER THAN THE E-2C BECAUSE OF THE FEWER AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR ROUGHLY THE SAME COVERAGE. THIS SHOULD HELP IN OVERCOMING THE COMMON IMPRESSION IN NATO THAT AWACS IS

AN EXPENSIVE LUXURY ITEM. BRIEF MENTION WAS MADE IN THE US PRESENTATIONS THAT MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN SYSTEM PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GROUND ENVIRONMENT INTER-FACE EQUIPMENT WAS BEING OFFERED, BUT THIS OFFER WAS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO APPEAR AS A MAJOR INCENTIVE AT THIS TIME. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE SPECIFIC REACTION TO THE ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES PROVIDED BY AWACS, SUCH AS STRATEGIC WARNING/ INTELLIGENCE AND IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS RESULTING FROM CROSS-TALK THROUGH SEEK BUS; HOWEVER, THESE ASPECTS MAY BE RECOGNIZED AND BECOME MORE IMPORTANT AS TIME PROGRESSES.

D. NADGE PROGRAMMING AND MANAGEMENT.

A SCHEDULED PRESENTATION ON NADGE FUNDING AND MANAGEMENT WAS NOT PRESENTED. THIS IS UNFORTUNATE BECAUSE THE SUB-GROUP HAS NOT YET DEVOTED SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING A WORK-ABLE PLAN OR CONCEPT FOR COMMON FUNDING OF PROCUREMENT AND O&M FOR A NATO AEW SYSTEM.

E. SUB-GROUP'S REPORT TO NAFAG AND FUTURE ACTIVITIES.

DURING THE CLOSING MOMENTS OF THE BUSINESS PORTION OF THE MEETING THE CHAIRMAN DISCUSSED HIS IDEAS FOR HIS REPORT TO NAFAG ON 20-21 NOV, AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING WORK REMAINING FOR THE SUB-GROUP. UNFORTUNATELY, THE TIME AVAILABLE WAS NOT ADEQUATE TO COVER THESE AREAS, MUCH LESS, TO DRAW OUT THE OPINIONS OF THE  
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SMALLER NATIONS. THE CHAIRMAN WILL TRY TO CIRCULATE AN ADVANCED COPY OF HIS REPORT TO NAFAG. THE REPORT IS EXPECTED TO COVER THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- (1) REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES TO DATE AND RESPONSES TO THE AEW QUESTIONNAIRE.
- (2) REPORT THAT THERE ARE FOUR CANDIDATE PROPOSALS (COUNTING THE FRENCH PRESENTATION) WHERE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS ARE POSSIBLE.
- (3) RECOMMENDATION THAT FRANCE AND THE UK BE PERMITTED TIME TO UPDATE THEIR PROPOSALS WITH THE SAME LEVEL OF PROGRAM AND COST DATA AS THE US PROPOSALS.
- (4) RECOMMENDATION THAT SHAPE CONDUCT ADDITIONAL STUDIES ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR A NATO AEW SYSTEM.
- (5) RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SUB-GROUP HAS COMPLETED ITS WORK OR THAT THE SUB-GROUP STAY IN EXISTENCE UNTIL THE FOUR PROPOSALS/SYSTEMS ARE MORE THOROUGHLY EVALUATED AND NARROWED TO THE ONE OR TWO MOST ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATES. (THIS LAST ITEM MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE CHAIRMAN'S REPORT).

3. USNATO COMMENT.

A. AT LEAST ONE, PERHAPS MORE, OF THE SMALLER NATIONS WHICH, IN RESPONSE TO THE AEW QUESTIONNAIRE, SAID THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN PROCUREMENT OF AN AEW SYSTEM THOUGHT QUESTIONS 2-5 (REF B.) AND NOT JUST QUESTION 2 REFERRED TO A NATIONAL SYSTEM INSTEAD OF A COMMON NATO SYSTEM. CONSEQUENTLY, THEIR ANSWERS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. MOST NATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE WORDED THEIR RESPONSES SO THAT THEY HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO DO ANYTHING THEY WANT WHEN THE TIME COMES. THE SMALLER COUNTRIES MAY BELIEVE THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE LARGE COUNTRIES WILL EVENTUALLY PROVIDE AN AEW CAPABILITY IN NATO WITHOUT COST TO THEM, AND ARE DELIBERATELY HOLDING BACK WHILE THEY SEE WHAT HAPPENS.

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B. MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHERE THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE IN SYSTEM PRODUCTION OR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF INTERFACE EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN GAINING ACCEPTANCE FOR THE US PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE SMALLER ALLIES.

C. THE BRITISH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR ONE OR MORE EUROPEAN PARTNERS FOR A UK LED AEW DEVELOPMENT. SINCE NONE HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING THUS FAR, THEY MAY SOON RECOGNIZE THAT THE R&D COSTS, BEFORE THE FIRST PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT COMES OFF THE LINE,

WOULD BE OF THE SAME ORDER OF MAGNITUDE AS THE TOTAL NATO AEW PROCUREMENT, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE COST EFFECTIVE TO GO IT ALONE FOR THE SMALL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED. THEY CERTAINLY RECOGNIZE THAT THEY COULD WAIT A YEAR OR TWO AND STILL MEET THEIR 1980-81 DEADLINE WITH EITHER OF THE US SYSTEMS. TO THIS END, THE US MAY WANT TO CONSIDER INITIATING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UK WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SATISFYING THE UK NATIONAL REQUIRE-  
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MENTS WITH THE SAME US SYSTEM THAT NATO SELECTS, THEREBY REDUCING UNIT PRICE TO BOTH NATO AND THE UK THROUGH PROCUREMENT OF A LARGER TOTAL QUANTITY. A NATO DECISION WOULD HELP PERSUADE THE U.K. AND VICE VERSA.

D. SG-12 NEEDS (1) A STRONG STATED MILITARY AEW REQUIREMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT (SHAPE DOES HAVE AN R&D OBJECTIVE FOR AEW) AND (2) A WORKABLE COMMON FUNDED NATO PROCUREMENT AND O&M CONCEPT OR PLAN. WITH RESPECT TO THE FORMER, THE REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS IN AC/280-D/36 SHOULD BE REFINED AND ASSIGNED PRIORITIES IN VIEW OF WHAT CAPABILITIES CAN BE REASONABLY EXPECTED FROM THE 4 CANDIDATE SYSTEMS. AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT INCLUDING AREAS OF COVERAGE, PERCENTAGE OR HOURS OF COVERAGE DURING PERIODS OF LOW AND HIGH TENSION, BASING CONCEPTS, TRANSIENT AND STATION TIME, NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT INCLUDING TRAINING AND SPARES, ETC., IS NECESSARY FOR THE SUB-GROUP TO DETERMINE AND EVALUATE COSTS OF THE CANDIDATE SYSTEMS WITH THE SAME GROUND RULES. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND POINT, BEFORE THE ALLIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO COMMIT TO A NATO AEW PROGRAM IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR NATO TO TELL THEM HOW MUCH THEIR SHARE OF THE PROCUREMENT AND O&M COSTS WILL BE AND HOW THESE ACTIONS WILL BE MANAGED. FORMATION OF A NATO AEW MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION, SUCH AS THAT ESTABLISHED FOR NADEGE, MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. FUNDING A PROGRAM OF THIS SIZE UNDER INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD BE EXTREMELY

DIFFICULT, CONSIDERING ALL THE OTHER DEMANDS, INCLUDING THE U.S. 100 PER CENT SHELTER INITIATIVE, FOR LIMITED INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS. ALL THE NATIONS

AND SHAPE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE THAT THE NATO AEW PROGRAM HAS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY.

SEPARATE FUNDING, SUCH AS USED FOR THE NATO HAWK CONSORTIUM, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AS MANY NATIONS AS ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE.

IF ONE OF THE U.S. SYSTEMS IS SELECTED, THE U.S. MIGHT CONSIDER OFFERING TO PROVIDE O&M UNDER SACEUR'S CONTROL FOR A FEE OR OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SO THAT NATO COULD BENEFIT FROM ECONOMIES RESULTING FROM COMMONALITY WITH A U.S. NATIONAL SYSTEM. IN FACT, THIS COULD BE USED AS AN ARGUMENT FOR SELECTION OF A U.S. SYSTEM. CERTAIN NATIONS COULD REDUCE THEIR YEARLY MONEY CONTRIBUTION BY PROVIDING BASES, SUPPORT, DEPOT FACILITIES, ETC., AND THE U.S. COULD REDUCE ITS MONEY CONTRIBUTION BY PROVIDING TRAINING OR  
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TRAINED PERSONNEL (E.G. AIRCREW AND MAINTENANCE), LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, ETC.

E. DURING THE 23-25 OCTOBER CNAD MEETING, A DECISION WAS MADE TO REQUEST STC TO STUDY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AWACS

IN THE NATO ENVIRONMENT. FRANCE, FRG, U.K. AND U.S. WILL MEET AND PROPOSE SCOPE AND TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR STUDY. THIS SHOULD RESULT IN REQUIREMENT STUDY AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT DISCUSSED ABOVE. CNAD DECISION IS A STRONG BOOST FOR AWACS. HOWEVER, SMALLER NATIONS MAY FEEL LEFT OUT AND SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK IN WHEN FEASIBLE.

F. THERE ARE MIXED FEELINGS CONCERNING THE FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF SG-12. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT A MULTI-LATERAL COOPATIVE PROCUREMENT IS THE BEST ANSWER, THEN THE NATO AEW PROGRAM SHOULD BE PASSED IN SUCCESSION TO OPEN AND CLOSED PROJECT GROUPS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR A COMMON FUNDED NATO PROGRAM (SEVERAL NATIONS HAVE INDICATED THEY WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES) THEN IT IS PROBABLY BETTER TO RETAIN SG-12.

G. FINALLY, MISSION BELIEVES THAT ACCEPTABILITY OF ALTERNATIVES A AND B IN STATE 197909 (REF. A) GAINED CONSIDERABLY IN RELATION TO ALTERNATIVE E (AND MAY EVEN BE AHEAD OF IT) AS WELL AS IN RELATION TO THE FRENCH AND U.K. PROPOSALS AS A RESULT OF PARIS PRESENTATIONS. RECOGNIZING THAT ENTHUSIASM BY REPRESENTATIVES IN SUB-GROUP IS NOT THE SAME AS ENTHUSIASM BY FINANCE MINISTERS IN CAPITALS, THE U.S. PROPOSALS STILL MADE SIGNIFICANT HEADWAY AT PARIS MEETING. AS SOME OF THE MORE SUBTLE POINTS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS, SUCH AS THE VALUE OF STRATEGIC WARNING/INTELLIGENCE, THE VULNERABILITY OF FORWARD NADGE SITES, THE FACT THAT THERE REALLY ARE NOT ANY OCST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES, ETC., ARE EVALUATED AND APPRECIATED BY THE VARIOUS ALLIES, FURTHER IMPROVEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED. MAIN CONCERN IS THAT ALTERNATIVES A AND B DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH OPPORTUNITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN SYSTEM PRODUCTION OR ANCILLARY DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO OTHER NATO/ NATIONAL ALTERNATIVES MAY OVERCOME THIS.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

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IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S.:

A. SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF SG-12;

B. CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.K. FOR U.K. PURCHASE OF A U.S. AEW AIRCRAFT FOR THEIR NATIONAL SYSTEM (ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED IN PARA. 3.C. ABOVE).

C. ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL AND MORE SPECIFIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALLIANCE NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN SYSTEM PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERFACE AND GROUND PROCESSING EQUIPMENT. (PERHAPS THESE SHOULD BE ORIENTED SLIGHTLY IN FAVOR OF THE SMALLER UNCOMMITTED NATIONS).  
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